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Abstract: The article examines the pathologisation of post-conflict societies through a 
comparison of the framing of the Cambodian and post-Yugoslav states. The notion of failed 
states fixes culpability for war on societies in question, rendering the domestic populations 
dysfunational while casting international rescue interventions as functional. The article 
suggests that the discourse of pathologisation can be understood not as a means of 
explaining state crisis so much as legitimising an indefinite international presence and 
deferring self-government. 
Introduction 
 
From Haiti in the Western Hemisphere to the remnants of Yugoslavia in Europe, 
from Somalia, Sudan and Libera in Africa to Cambodia in Southeast Asia, a 
disturbing new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation-state, utterly incapable of 
sustaining itself as a member of the international community.
1
 
Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner‟s conceptualisation of “failed states” posits the origins of 
state failure as congenital, inherent in the “vast proliferation of nation-states” with 
decolonization.
2
  They cast doubts not only upon the capacity of post-colonial states, but also 
the capacities of post-colonial populations for self-government. Drawing parallels between 
these populations and the insane, they propose forms of international trusteeship as the only 
viable solution for these societies: 
In domestic systems, when the polity confronts persons who are utterly incapable of 
functioning on their own, the law often provides some regime whereby the 
community itself manages the affairs of the victim.  Forms of guardianship or 
trusteeship are a common response to broken families, serious mental or physical 
illness, or economic destitution.  The hapless individual is placed under the 
responsibility of a trustee or guardian, who is charged to look out for the best 
interests of that person.
3
 
In the decade since these comments, international supervision of so-called failed states has 
expanded, although these states are formally recognized as sovereign, and are not under 
formal trusteeship arrangements.  While some parallels can be drawn, the contemporary 
mode of regulating these states is distinct from colonial rule.  Formal colonial government 
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was based upon the manipulation of local communities via their elites.  Contemporary 
international government, by contrast, seeks the transformation of individual attitudes, via 
programmes of training and discipline.  In the technologies of knowledge of contemporary 
international governance, we can see a shift from anthropological approaches to the 
government of indigenous societies, to social risk management approaches to the government 
of individuals, informed by social psychology perspectives.
4
 
This shift towards “therapeutic governance”5 goes hand in hand with the victory of free 
market economics as the governing ideology of the 1990s.  Perspectives on conflict emerging 
from psychosocial foundations frame out of analysis questions of political or economic 
structure; they also downplay the significance of the state as the institutional expression of 
self-determination on the part of the political community.  The complexity of inter-relations 
between the state, society and trans/international forces in a globalizing world is subordinated 
to the simple metric of the rationality of individual agency. Conflict is represented as a series 
of individual experiences of violence.  States are portrayed as failed service providers run 
amok, separate from victimized and oppressed populations, even while preying upon them.  
Societies are viewed as formed of violated or violating individuals, whose actions spring in a 
hopeless cycle of conflict from psychological processes rather than from political beliefs or 
economic needs.  This elision of political processes from the depiction of problems of 
conflict, oppression and poverty has opened the way for therapeutic approaches to 
intervention. 
This chapter uses two case studies –Cambodia and the post-Yugoslav states – to illustrate the 
elision of politics from “failed state” rhetoric and to indicate the implications of this for 
interventionary policy.  It is argued that the language of state failure and social victimhood 
forms a discourse that writes out sophisticated analyses of conflict.  The complexity of 
politics, social and economic imperatives that both render conflict and violence an option for 
ordinary people, and determine responses to it, are ignored in favour of a view of conflict as 
causeless (“the confiscation of memory”) and responses as traumatized (“the pathologization 
of populations”).  In adopting this approach, contradictions between the universal imperative 
of liberal humanitarianism and the exclusionary imperative of territorial democracy are 
elegantly solved through the denial of capacities for autonomy to populations.  Echoing 
colonial discourses which awarded rights only to “mature” populations, this discursive 
strategy delegitimates local politics and gives the green light for the disciplinary and 
rationalizing intervention of outside forces.  By this means, the international discourse of 
failed states legitimizes perpetual international supervision. 
This discourse has taken a populist and militarist turn since the events of September 11
th
.  
This turn is notable for the lack of self-consciousness with which it attributes irrational action 
to “barbarians at the gates” whose psychotic natures are assumed, rather than explained with 
reference to psychosocial models of conflict. However, similar consequences emerge from 
both the flamboyant militarism of the Bush Administration and from the sympathetic therapy 
offered by liberal accounts.  In both cases, the distinction between empowered and 
disempowered is legitimised by obliterating the notion of the self-determining subject as the 
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basis for government, denying the possibility of either liberalism or democracy for people in 
post-conflict societies. 
Myths of Origin and the Confiscation of Memory 
The spatial, temporal and theoretical framing of conflict by intervenors and analysts 
represents a significant exercise of power in the politics of post-conflict societies.  Framing 
historical events in contingent understandings of relevant time and space puts particular 
actors “in the frame” while others remain outside it.  In the case of both the former 
Yugoslavia and Cambodia, the notion of the failed state as the causeless cause of conflict has 
been promoted, in a manner which foregrounds, and renders inexplicable, the horrors of war.  
The international and local political and economic context for the initial descent into violence 
are framed out of analysis.  Media, policy, and many academic reports of conflict in these 
two countries have focused narrowly on atrocities rather than on the causes of war.  By 
reducing analysis of war to an unexplained spectacle of horror, the way is cleared for a 
redefinition of war itself, as a series of psychotic actions by individuals.  The site of conflict 
becomes the irrational individual, and their acts are not the continuation of politics but of 
psychology.  Pathological psychoses are central to the explanation of conflict, while reference 
to the coping strategies of survivors in these situations are fleeting and rare. 
Framing war in this way omits two significant matrices of activity – those of society and of 
international relations – without which war becomes inexplicable and hence irrational.  
Omitting analysis of society precludes attention to the intertwined processes of identity 
formation and economic distribution, which constitute group allegiances and perceptions of 
survival imperatives.  This prevents analysis of how group strategies for satisfying perceived 
basic needs are formulated.  International relations are similarly framed out of analysis, as 
state failure is seen to arise purely from within national boundaries.  For example, a joint 
report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the US 
Army recently suggested that “failed states – if left to their own devices – can provide a safe 
haven for a diverse array of transnational threats…  As such failed states can pose a direct 
threat to the national security of the United States and to the stability of entire regions.”6 
Instead, conflict and state failure are blamed upon imputed cultural and historical “legacies,”  
offering an explanatory framework within which individual‟s actions appear as unthinking 
responses to cultural stimuli.  Here, the cultural iconography of political rhetoric is mistaken 
for the substance of political motivation, so that the individual appears trapped in the thrall of 
a distant past, motivated by the concerns of previous centuries – a pre-citizen left behind by 
modernity, rather than a citizen responding to an imperfect modern world. 
The significance of temporal framing to understanding the causes of warfare is evident in 
policy approaches to post-conflict rebuilding in Cambodia.  Cambodia‟s history has long 
been framed in terms of two opposing points.  The first is a supposed zenith from the tenth to 
the fifteenth century, when the Khmer Empire based at Angkor dominated mainland 
Southeast Asia, and created irrigation projects and temple networks commonly regarded as 
engineering and artistic masterpieces.  The second is the nadir of the Democratic Kampuchea 
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regime of 1975-8, when a radical communist regime implemented social engineering projects 
that directly caused the deaths of millions. 
For Western journalists the romantic juxtaposition of a lost civilization and a contemporary 
holocaust continues to dominate media portrayals of Cambodia.  Frequently, the 
achievements of Angkor and the disaster of the DK are represented as intimately linked, even 
by international policy analysts.  For example, Brown and Timberman in 1998 saw continued 
political turbulence in Cambodia as evidence for a cultural legacy illustrated in the depictions 
of ancient warfare carved in bas-relief at the ruins of Angkor: 
One can glimpse the tragic predicament of Cambodia in 1998 reflected in the history 
of the Khmer Empire in the ninth century as well as in the authoritarian habits of a 
civilization that flourished almost a millennium ago.
7
  
Of the period between Angkor and the start of the civil war that brought the “Khmer Rouge” 
to power, relatively little has been written, permitting the assumption of cultural stasis 
informing Brown and Timberman‟s remark.8  The era has been broadly portrayed as one of 
political, economic and military eclipse, temporarily arrested by the establishment of a 
French “protectorate” in 1863, a discourse energetically promulgated by the French 
themselves.
9
   The fall from Angkor to DK is regarded locally and internationally as a 
“tragedy” of Cambodian history, briefly arrested by colonialism, suggesting an inevitability 
that separates Cambodian society from any sense of rational political agency in response to 
contingent events.  This view has been challenged by David Chandler, the leading historian 
of Cambodia‟s so-called “dark ages.”  Chandler argues that the abandonment of Angkor‟s 
glories in favour of a more prosaic capital at Phnom Penh from the 15
th
 century resulted from 
increasing involvement in regional commerce, prompting diversion of economic surpluses 
into more practical enterprises than temple-building.
10
 
Significnatly, this “tragic” approach has enjoyed a resurgence in writings on Cambodia in the 
1990s, as compared to the 1970s – the era of greatest destruction.  For example, the US role 
in prompting Cambodia‟s disastrous entry into the Vietnam War in 1970s was examined 
critically in William Shawcross‟s 1979 study, Sideshow: Nixon, Kissinger and the 
Destruction of Cambodia.  Shawcross introduces his book as “a look at the foreign policy 
side of Watergate,” indicating the connection between this detailed exposure of international 
intervention in Cambodia and the decline in confidence in American institutions in the mid to 
late-1970s. 
In the 1990s, with the United States back in the ascendant, the impact of international politics 
on the Cambodia conflict has been less emphasized and the discourse of “state failure” has 
prevailed.  This is particularly evident in studies focusing on the United Nations‟ operation in 
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Cambodia from 1991-3 as a “new dawn” for a country whose civil war had become detached 
from international imperatives – and hence incomprehensible - following the Cold War‟s end. 
A key UN role in Cambodia was to verify the withdrawal of “foreign forces” from 
Cambodian territory.  The successful achievement of this goal was noted in a Security 
Council resolution as “restoring to the Cambodian people and their democratically elected 
leaders their primary responsibility for peace, stability, national reconciliation and 
reconstruction in their country.”11  This assertion of  re-established Cambodian sovereignty 
and responsibility was substituted, in a number of commentaries of post-intervention 
Cambodia, for a careful analysis of the effects of previous decades of intervention and 
occupation on social and political attitudes and structures.  A number of accounts of the “new 
Cambodia”12 have adopted a simplistic opposition between the failure of state/society and the 
rationality of international plans for rescue and redevelopment.  This model eschews detailed 
analysis of the political and economic, local and international dynamics of politics in the 
1970s and 1980s, or of the complexity of global-local relations in Cambodia in the 1990s.  
Rather, a tendency has emerged to return to analytical frameworks common in the 1950s and 
1960s, focusing upon the emotionally-charged policy decisions of charismatic leaders,
13
 in 
contention with rational international experts, set against an amorphous, passive, culturally 
static and “damaged” population.14 
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In writing out a systematic analysis of international and local dimensions of the conflict, and 
the impact of these upon conceptions of politics and community prevailing in everyday life, 
this framing of Cambodian politics also writes out any conception of contemporary political 
agency on the part of ordinary Cambodians themselves.  Thus anthropologist Judy 
Ledgerwood notes that, “in most discussions of Cambodian political and economic 
development, the vast peasant majority, living at subsistence level, is generally invisible and 
silent.”15   This echoes the situation in the 1950s and 60s.  Historians David Chandler and 
Ben Kiernan wrote in 1983: 
We know a good deal… about „politics at the top‟ in the Sihanouk era…; but how 
did the economic and social changes that swept over Kampuchea in these years 
affect the majority of its people?  We know very little about local-level politics.
16
 
A view of Cambodian politics as essentially the machinations of a tiny elite foisted onto a 
servile population is evident in the attitudes of many international policy-makers.  For 
example, a long-running debate over an international tribunal to try former DK leaders has 
focused extensively on the political imperatives of different current leaders in supporting or 
obstructing the initiative, but there has been little attempt to survey the Cambodian 
population on the issue.  Similarly, despite long-standing evidence that the commission of 
atrocities was widespread among party cadre across the country, the tribunal‟s international 
proponents have focused myopically on the prosecution of a handful of leaders, rather than a 
truth-telling exercise to promote wider reconciliation.  Perhaps most tellingly, a group of 
experts commissioned to make recommendations on the scope of a tribunal recommended 
that this be limited to crimes committed between April 17 1975 – the date the DK came to 
power, five days after the evacuation of the US embassy in Phnom Penh – and 7 January 
1978 – the date on which the Vietnamese army arrived there.17  This limitation both 
decontextualises the crimes that took place as explicable with reference to the contemporary 
history and international relations of Cambodia and effectively exculpates foreigners from 
any responsibility. 
In the case of the post-Yugoslav states, year zero for the origins of conflict appears to be lost 
in the mists of time. Following Duffield
18
, accounts may be divided into “New Barbarian” 
and “multiculturalist” perspectives. The first group consists of those that see ethnic conflict as 
an endemic feature of the region.
19
 History is portrayed as having a particular hold over the 
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population. „For them, history is alive today‟, argues the historian Dennis Hupchick.20 The 
protagonists are often characterised as being locked in ancient feuds.
21
 The idea of South Slav 
atavism is reflected in book titles, for example, Robert Kaplan‟s Balkan Ghosts: A Journey 
Through History. The second group consists of those that characterise the war as Serbian 
aggression,
22
 and to a lesser extent (since 1993) as Croatian aggression as well. In the second 
group, the culture of the Serbs is singled out as intolerant and atavistic. Historical memory is 
considered to have a peculiar hold over the Serbs and account after account seeks to analyse 
Serbian nationalism through the prism of the Battle of Kosovo of 1389. 
Although accounts single out history, what is striking is the lack of analysis of the history of 
the Yugoslav state itself. While the first group regards Yugoslavia as a „prison of nations‟ or 
a „Balkans powder keg‟, the second group by-passes discussion of Yugoslavia as a 
multicultural state and instead elevates Bosnia as an embodiment of multiculturalism, 
although the inter-ethnic harmony of the latter was contingent upon the harmony of wider 
South Slav relations. The existence of the Yugoslav state is treated as artificial, the product of 
“traumatised nationalisms” and framed out of analysis. For example, Eric Hobsbawm writes 
of Yugoslavia as a failed state from its inception because of history:  
The explosive issues of 1988-92 were those created in 1918-21. […] Czechs were 
yoked to Slovaks for the first time, and Slovenes (formerly Austrian) with Croats 
and [...] across a millennium of divergent history, with the Serbs who belonged to 
Orthodoxy and the Ottoman empire.
23
 
The one commonly cited reference point is the period of the Second World War when again 
Yugoslavia did not exist as a state and was under Nazi occupation. Symptomatic of this 
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marginalisation of the experiences under the Yugoslav state, there has been more reference to 
the 600-year-old Battle of Kosovo than, for example, analysis of problems with SFR 
Yugoslavia‟s sophisticated ethnic rights approach.24 Ironically in this denial of Yugoslavia, or 
what the Croatian writer Dubravka Ugrei has characterised „The Confiscation of 
Memory‟,25 contemporary Western historiography is following the approach of ethnic 
nationalists. Such is this denial of Yugoslavia, that a collection of essays by young people 
from former Yugoslav is entitled Children of Atlantis, invoking the lost city of the Greek 
myths.
26
 One quotation evokes this experience of denial: 
Where do you come from? 
From Yugoslavia. 
Is there any such country? 
No, but that‟s still where I come from. 
These framings of conflicts conspire not only to place responsibility for the conflict firmly 
upon the local populations themselves, but also to claim that the motivations for such conflict 
– motivations which cannot be understood in isolation from a broader international and 
regional context – emerge from the innate predisposition toward violence of the respective 
societies. The careful screening out of factors that might render the causes of war 
understandable leaves damaged individuals, communally comprising a sick society, firmly in 
the frame.  
 
Pathologised Populations 
The therapeutic paradigm goes beyond state failure to pathologise whole populations as 
irrational, by contending that individuals, communities and whole societies are traumatized 
from war, and trapped in cycles of violence perpetuated from generation to generation.  This 
approached has emerged particularly from studies of refugees in a medicalised setting.  
Aihwa Ong‟s study of the reception of Khmer refugees in the US indicates that these were 
viewed by American professionals in health and social services as threatening and unruly 
bodies, bearing a “backward” and “antiquated” culture, requiring discipline by US 
institutions and treatment according to US therapeutic models.
27
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In this therapeutic paradigm, war-affected populations are projected to be suffering from 
mass trauma and in need of mass therapeutic intervention. A much cited report on Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia contends, „An estimate shows that about 700,000 people in the two 
countries have a severe trauma response condition and are in need of professional help. The 
consequences of lack of assistance will have a massive impact in the next generations, and 
can even ignite new wars.‟28  Thus, trauma is conceptualised not only as a consequence but a 
cause of war.  Similarly, Bogdan Denitsch writes of „the powerful reservoir of traumatic 
memory‟ transmitted from generation to generation as the cause of ethnic conflict in former 
Yugoslavia.
29
  
The powerful invocation of a medical imperative has been important in the discursive 
justification of interventionary practices. Likewise Kevin Cahill speaks of expanding 
preventive diplomacy in medical terms of an “epidemiology of conflict,”30 capable of giving 
rise to remedies and preventive medicines. The use of the medical metaphor has far-reaching 
implications for perceptions of appropriate roles for those cast as patients and doctors 
respectively.  The international medical humanitarian organisation Medecins sans Frontiers, 
for example, has been a key proponent of the precedence of humanitarian intervention over 
the principle of national sovereignty, in line with the dictum that doctor knows best.  To the 
extent that the diagnosis points to mental rather than merely physical illness, the 
delegitimation of local agency is completed.  In the mid-1990s, foreign policy analysts made 
this shift explicit in their discussion of the potential to move from the “surgical” strikes of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s to a “psychiatric” approach to post-conflict societies, viewed as 
requiring long-term therapy rather than invasive treatment.
31
 Both medical models deny 
political agency of the protagonists; while the surgical approach suggests radical curative 
invasion, the psychiatric approach suggests, instead, a potentially unending disciplinary 
intervention, similarly awarding power to the professional to define the limits of normality 
and to impose therapeutic regimes.  
The framing as war as a pathological response to mental ill-health is limited to war-making in 
non-western states.  There is a stark contrast between portrayals of war between Cambodians, 
former Yugsolavs, Afghans and Iraqis, and portrayals of war-making by western powers, 
which is invariably portrayed as “ethical” and “surgical”, even when conducted in the same 
“theatre of operations.” A pathological view of the Cambodian war has been imposed despite 
direct and overt connections between this war, the Vietnam War and the overarching Cold 
War pursued by the superpowers. Similarly there has been intimate external involvement in 
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the Yugoslav wars of succession, yet while the local protagonists in former Yugoslavia have 
been pathologised, outsiders continue to be treated as neutral arbiters. 
In a move which brings the discourse around in an unbreakable circle of logic, the difference 
between those conducting pathological war, and those conducting ethical or surgical strikes, 
is promoted as being “trauma” itself.  This is proposed not only as causing war in a cycle of 
violence reaching back to the Middle Ages, but as requiring open-ended international 
supervision in post-war situations to prevent war breaking out again. Trauma, particularly 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, is attributed to populations despite a lack of data regarding 
the actual prevalance of this neurological syndrome.  Grant Curtis, for example, writes that  
“although there has been no systematic study, particularly within 
Cambodia, survivors of the Cambodian holocaust are widely reported to 
suffer [from a variety of symptoms of mental health problems…  In the 
absence of hard data, it can only be assumed that Cambodia and its people 
continue to suffer the effects of mass post-traumatic stress syndrome.”  
Curtis further cited a UN Border Relief Operation report, which stated, “Many Khmer now 
stable in Site Two [border camp] will experience psychological collapse when they are 
resettled or repatriated.”  As evidence that this in fact occurred, Curtis goes on to cite a 1995 
survey of the resettlement and reintegration of the returnee population revealing “up to 40 per 
cent of returnees were „not coping‟ in an economic sense.”32  It is indicative that the failure to 
cope “in an economic sense” is regarded as evidence of problems in the mental health of the 
individual, rather than in the health of the Cambodian economy, where opportunities, 
particularly for the landless, are minimal.  Faith in therapeutic studies becomes self-fulfilling 
when difficulty in coping with life in an impoverished Cambodia is regarded as evidence of 
“psychological collapse.”  
Likewise, psychosocial intervention involving „activities that lead towards relying on their 
own work and independence from other people‟s help and support‟33 is a key international 
response to economic and social difficulties in the post-Yugoslav states. However, 
individuals have to demonstrate extraordinary entrepreneurial skills simply to secure basic 
welfare in circumstances of mass unemployment exceeding fifty percent in Bosnia. Where 
the psychological state of individuals is seen as the primary economic problem, the 
contribution of international policy to economic constraints is sidelined.  For example, in the 
post-Yugoslav states local economies do not necessarily conform to internationally-
recognised borders at the end of the 1990s.  Attempts to create the de jure international 
borders of the post-Yugoslav states has undermined cross-border economic ties indirectly or 
directly (through sanctions), constraining economic opportunities.   
Thus, the therapeutic paradigm becomes a cure-all and an apology for the inability of 
international actors to realise their blueprints for the countries.  The responses of people in 
the Balkans, rather than international policies themselves, are singled out as defective.  In 
Bosnia, the population is loudly denounced as dysfunctional for failing to endorse and 
implement internationally-imposed constitutional arrangements under the Dayton General 
Framework Agreement of 1995.  Less widely reported are trenchant criticisms of Dayton, 
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made even by those international officials who drafted and implemented the plan.
34
  The 
dysfunctionality of Dayton, and the shifting of blame to the population, has been repeated in 
Kosovo, where the international community blames continuing inter-ethnic violence on the 
psychological legacy of “wartime traumas.”35  Framed out is the choice of a war strategy, by 
the international community, which militarized ethnic relations in Kosovo in 1998-9, 
effectively creating and training the Kosovo Liberation Army and precipitating the 
transformation of ethnic divisions into all-out war. 
The pathologisation of populations as traumatized and brutalized, alongside the framing out 
of political processes – both local and international – in influencing national institutions of 
state permits the de facto denial of sovereignty, since it permits the population to be 
presumed incapable of sovereign acts.  Ordinary people of both Cambodia and the post-
Yugoslav states are portrayed on the one hand as passively awaiting deliverance at the hands 
of foreign intervenors, on the other hand as not to be trusted with the responsibilities of 
reconstructing their countries, even when authoritarian regimes have been overthrown. 
Denitsch argues, „in a period of nationalist euphoria, it is extraordinarily dangerous to leave 
the questions of the national content of education to teachers. On the other hand, when one 
considers what demagogic games will be played with this type of question, can it be left to 
the politicians, albeit democratically elected?‟36 The conclusion drawn is that the people are 
unfit for self-government and need the protection of the international community.   Restoring 
self-government requires nothing less than the radical transformation of individuals, cultures, 
and society as a whole.  Thus the challenge is “to build a new country”37 and to create „a new 
set of values, new traditions.‟38  A British official in Sarajevo, Brian Hopkinson, describes the 
international community‟s attempts to implement Dayton as „fighting a whole culture‟.39 
Implications for Intervention 
The portrayal of populations as mentally and/or culturally trapped in destructive behaviour 
patterns has two effects.  Firstly, it entails that leaders may be viewed as motivated, not by 
concern to finesse conflicting pressures emerging from society, but by their own greed, 
ambition and venality.  This delegitimates their position, undermines their claim to represent 
society, and justifies open-ended and repeated international intervention on behalf of 
populations. Secondly, the powerlessness of ordinary people, manifested as passivity 
interspersed with bouts of destructive rage, entails that foreign intervention must act not only 
upon the state but upon society also, to create new individuals with the capacity for self-
government.  Both these presumptions justify the derogation of sovereignty and the 
substitution of international discipline for national politics. 
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Former UN High Representative in Bosnia Wolfgang Petrisch describes the need for Bosnian 
„ownership‟ of the peace; yet his use of this term in a series of articles and press releases40, 
shows that local ownership does not imply autonomy.  Rather, Petrich means that the 
Bosnians should take responsibility for the past and must implement Dayton:  „Our new 
approach is “ownership”. This implies local ownership not just of assets, but of the problems 
inherited from communism and war. Indeed, it implies the entire process of Dayton 
implementation, the very future of Bosnia-Herzegovina itself‟.41 Local enforcement of 
externally-devised policy does not equate to national self-determination. Indicatively, while 
Petrisch‟s pronouncements in English may use the language of „ownership‟, those in Serbo-
Croat tend to refer to „odgovornost‟ („responsibility‟).42 As in Cambodia, international 
supervision over policy formation and implementation continues while „responsibility‟ for 
failure is awarded exclusively to the national government and indigenous population. 
Criticism of the failure of the populations to take responsibility is typical of the disavowal of 
external regulation within a discourse of intervention disguised in the language of 
emancipation.  Thus policy programmes speak of “empowerment”, “instilling in civil 
values,” and “vigorously condemning and taking concerted action against events and 
individuals that contravene peace, human rights and democracy.” The legitimacy of these 
exercises of external power is assumed and even expected, even though it conflicts directly 
with the stated objective of promoting self-government. For example, Brown and Timberman 
lament how in Cambodia, until shortly before the 1998 election, “no central authority, such as 
the UN, has assumed responsibility for certifying whether the elections are free and fair.”43 
The characterization of the UN as a “central authority” is indicative of assumptions regarding 
international jurisdiction over Cambodia. 
Although the avowed aim of the international presence remains to promote democracy, 
doubts about the capacity of the populations of Cambodia and former Yugoslavia for liberal 
citizenship prompt curtailment of their political rights.  In both cases distrust of local 
populations has prompted strict policing of collective action and perceptions of the need to 
discipline damaged and culturally malprogrammed citizens into appropriate behavioural 
norms.  Consequently, while responsibility for politics is to be placed back on the shoulders 
of local people, this is a disciplined politics, regulated by international norms.  Debate over 
these norms is discouraged, producing „choiceless democracies,‟ in which parties and 
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electorates offer anodyne and identical policy platforms that accord with international 
principles. 
To implement its mandate towards an integrated Bosnia lacking popular support, the 
international community‟s democratisation initiatives are taking on an increasingly coercive 
role to impose Dayton, calling into question the very democratic and legal rights the 
international organisations are mandated to uphold. The current international High 
Representative Wolfgang Petritsch outlines how his predecessor increasingly imposed 
decisions:  
The history so far has been that the high representative has increasingly had to 
impose the decisions on reforms.  
During his two-year term, my predecessor, Carlos Westerndorp, imposed over 45 
decisions and laws on the country, dealing with everything from the design of 
banknotes to the establishment of the courts. He was also forced to remove 16 
high-ranking officials from their positions, including the president of the ethnic 
Serb component, Republika Srpska, for obstructing the implementation of the 
peace.
44
 
Petritsch himself has gone further than his predecessor in his dismissal of Bosnian officials, 
annulment of laws and readiness to impose laws in the face of any failure by the Bosnian 
Parliament to ratify the drafts presented to them by Petrisch‟s office.45 
In response to the difficulties experienced in managing the polity in both Cambodia and the 
Balkans, international policy has adopted four key strategies: the international supervision 
and policing of the state; promotion of atomized forms of political participation, such as 
elections; attempts to police the collective action of civil society, and most intrusively, to 
reconstruct culture and the very personality of individuals through psychosocial intervention 
involving both formal and informal education from parenting to relationship counseling. 
Incrementally, over the last decade, international peacekeeping has shifted from the 
monitoring of cease-fires to the international administration and supervision of so-called 
failed states. What began as ad hoc programmes focusing on themes of civic education, 
conflict resolution, mutual respect and tolerance are becoming more systematic with the 
international community now involved in curriculum planning, health and social policy 
reform, and professional training.  
At the same time, the scope of international intervention has widened.  The early to mid 
1990s saw a shift from the state sector to the NGO sector in line with the prevalent neoliberal 
view of the state as inherently inefficient and abusive compared to the private sector.  In 
consequence, local individuals were engaged in internationally supervised, trained and 
funded NGOs, whose growing influence created a further shift of power away from locals to 
organisations accountable to foreign donors. Such NGOs, described by one United Nations 
Special Representative for Human Rights in Cambodia as “the children of the UN”46 were 
promoted specifically as vehicles for the re-socialization of the population into internationally 
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accepted values. International observers and participants in UNTAC‟s mission recall  
“paternalism”47 and “colonialism”48 in UNTAC‟s attitudes: 
During UNTAC ... there was a patronising attitude, they are like children, 
they can‟t stand on their own feet, they don‟t know what they are 
doing....[UNTAC] failed to think of the NGOs as independent, self-
sustaining, domestic entities.  It thought of them as outgrowths of the UN.
49
 
The focus on international sponsorship of civil society continued after UNTAC‟s departure, 
and continued to include strong exhortations to Cambodian NGOs to focus upon international 
priorities and to use international methods.  An international human rights worker leading an 
INGO set up to train Cambodian human rights NGOs stated: 
We had to work to give them this heavy re-orientation on what they were 
doing and what they were supposed to do.  We had to say, „No, no, no - as 
a human rights NGO, this is what you should do‟. That takes time... the 
human rights NGOs are still struggling to learn themselves just exactly 
what human rights work is.
50
 
In the late 1990s, a significant shift occurred in donor policy.  Disillusioned with the 
performance of NGOs as “schools for democracy” producing enlightened leaders with 
appropriate attitudes, donors began to drift back towards the state, with a more penetrative 
programme of intervention which involved embedding international staff into state ministries.  
The rationale for retreat from support for NGOs was described by one donor official in 
Cambodia as a response to the fact that NGOs “crowd out the private sector” while failing to 
exert its salutory disciplinary effects.
51
   
Both the promotion of sanctioned collective action, and the subsequent retreat from this as 
insufficiently amenable to the discipline of both donors and markets is indicative of a mistrust 
of spontaneous mobilization beyond the supervision of disciplinary intervenors. Thus, 
Michael Doyle writes that after the UN intervention in Cambodia in 1992-3, state policies 
failed to promote economic equality. While he locates this in a nuanced examination of 
regional and national economic and social factors, he writes: “Urban-rural inequality 
continued to heighten, engendering rural anger with ominous overtones.”52  Doyle does not 
describe the manifestation of this “anger,” nor explain why it is “ominous.”  However, he 
reflects the view of many international intervenors in Cambodia who regard mobilization, of 
the rural population in particular, as likely to lead to outbreaks of dangerous violence, thus 
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perpetuating the view of Cambodians as incapable of self-determined and self–determining 
action in response to political and economic questions. Even demonstrations by pensioners in 
Bosnia against internationally-imposed pension reforms were greeted with alarm by 
international officials. 
International intervention has consistently worked to subordinate spontaneity in political 
relations to an internationally sponsored discipline enforced by the insistence on processes 
and procedures, prescribed in the name of “security.”  In conjunction with broader framings 
of the populations as mired in dangerous psychological and cultural predispositions, the 
implication is that the people must be disciplined to prevent unruly and harmful behaviour. 
This presumption lays the foundation for an open-ended intervention, the success of which is 
only amenable to the international intervenor, the local partners being inherently incapable of 
judging their own mental status.  Far-reaching intervention to atomize and regiment societies 
is justified in the name of a long-term “cure” that is beyond the control of local actors, and 
may eventually be judged unattainable.  
International Community on the Couch 
What is the local response to this pathologisation?  Among professionals in the post-
Yugsolav states, there is receptivity to therapeutic approaches.  Social atomisation arising 
from marketisation of relations has encouraged individualistic outlooks and psychological 
approaches. Lasch‟s description of politics in the West degenerating into a struggle for self-
realisation captures developments in the post-Yugoslav states well.
53
  The perspectives of the 
peace movement in the West and its emphasis on self-transformation have influenced the 
1968 generation of Yugoslav youth. Young peoples have vacated the field of politics. 
Psychological approaches and studying psychology are growing in popularity with the 
younger generation as in the West, while structural approaches often smack to them of the 
failed policies of the discredited Communists.  The status of psychologists is already higher 
in former Yugoslavia than in the US and Britain, and is rising.
54
  Many schools already have 
their own psychologist, forming another important constituency where the new therapeutic 
approaches are being disseminated. Professional training in Bosnia is directly incorporating 
therapeutic approaches through seminars on education policy with staff from the Universities 
of Pittsburg, London and Munich to cite just three initiatives.  Within Cambodia, where even 
the most basic health services are very poor, there has been a tendency to focus on cultural 
rather than psychological “remedies.” Vigorous internal debate on the pathological nature of 
a collective Khmer “mentality”55 has prompted a continued deferral to international experts 
and intervenors which some international aid officials in the 1990s came to regard as a 
worrying sign of “dependency.”56    
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Nevertheless, there has been some disquiet expressed about the therapeutic paradigm, 
predominantly by writers, at least in the former Yugoslavia. Sarajevan author Miljenko 
Jergovi, in his 1997 short story A Diagnosis, satirizes the pathologisation of the Balkan 
Wars in his account of a hero who is declared insane even though, as the narrator comments, 
his behaviour is no different from anybody else‟s in the world. Jergovi‟s hero acquiesces to 
incarceration in an asylum and subordination to its therapeutic regime, but he maintains a 
critical stance towards his treatment. When asked what he would do to the murderers of his 
family his reply is that he would either kill them or „I would give them a pen and paper and 
tell them, as you tell me, to DRAW‟.57 In another of his stories, Jergovi describes the power 
of these discourses to limit resistance in the form of alternative imaginings of the nature of 
armed struggle.  In The Gravedigger, the eponymous hero meets an American journalist 
whose view of Bosnia is steeped in preconceptions.  The gravedigger recognises that, 
„Whatever I say, he‟ll just think, „Look at these mad people!‟ and eventually regrets his 
attempts to challenge this view: 
„Later on, I regretted that I ever opened my big mouth to the American. 
Why didn‟t I just say that we are an unhappy and unarmed people who are 
being killed by Chetnik beasts, and that we‟ve all gone crazy with 
bereavement and grief? He could have written that down, and I wouldn‟t 
have ended up looking ridiculous in his eyes or in my own‟.58 
Resistance is limited to the everyday victories to be gained from manipulating and subverting 
imposed discursive hegemonies – for example, in an interview in September 1998 a Croatian 
journalist boasted of how he had got to sleep with an unnamed famous Western female 
reporter at the Holiday Inn, by means of inventing a story about the death of a friend to elicit 
her sympathy.  The importance of such boasts do not lie in their doubtful veracity, but in the 
fantasy of subverting the relationship of framer to framed. However, this subversion of the 
relationship remains in the world of fantasy and both Cambodia and the post-Yugoslav states 
continue to be shaped by external forces. 
Four decades ago Fanon in Wretched of the Earth
59
 condemned the pathologisation of the 
Third World, instead indicting colonialism itself as pathological. Fanon‟s critique, once 
fashionable in aid circles has been forgotten. Today, instead of pathologising states as failed 
and populations as dysfunctional, pathological international relations that create failed states 
should be subject to interrogation. Indeed Ugresic describes the war in Bosnia as bringing 
Europeans: 
an unexpected collective psychotherapeutic gift […] The liveshow, the war in 
Bosnia, quickens the collective metabolism, cleanses moral and intellectual 
attitudes, revives forgotten traumas, stimulates re-interpretations. The war in 
Bosnia is a collective healing seance, a grandiose spectacle of virtual reality, a 
live hallucination, a virtual encounter with forgotten evil.
60
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Ugresic points the figure at the pathological needs of western society to intervene, that 
ultimately the impulse to pathologise other societies lies in the sense of crisis in the west, 
projected onto other societies.  While the deleterious effects of conflict and violence on the 
individual and society are clear, the portrayal of conflict as emerging from the darkest realms 
of the psyche of the Other, who must be protected and healed by Western instrumental 
rationality and care, obliterates a political and economic analysis of the causes of conflict and 
their effects in favour of either military suppression or sympathetic smothering. Western 
power and rightfulness is reaffirmed, but at the expense of the aspirations for autonomy of 
entire populations. 
 
